

THE CITIES OF GOD VERSUS THE COUNTRIES OF EARTH: THE RESTRICTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (RRF) INDEX

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Abstract

This paper proposes an index of the restriction of religious freedom (RRF) which can be updated annually for 196 countries. This same coding methodology can be used to generate measures for previous time periods. The data used to conduct this analysis are new. They are my quantitative coding of the 196 qualitative reports which comprise the 838-page¹ U.S. State Department annual *International Religious Freedom Report*, released on December 18, 2003. I use them because of their fresh currency, breadth of coverage, incorporation of trend information, and depth of inquiry specifically related to religious freedom. The RRF Index's reliability is established by its significant correlation to other international measures that theoretically or directly relate to religious freedom. The RRF Index addresses the reality of social facts, i.e., that religious freedom is not only restricted by the legal/policy regulations of countries, but also by the hegemonic activities of "religious brands."

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¹ Printed web pages.

THE CITIES OF GOD VERSUS THE COUNTRIES OF EARTH: THE RESTRICTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (RRF)

If there were only one religion ... there would be danger of despotism, if there were two, they would cut each other's throats, but there are thirty, and they live in peace and happiness.

— Voltaire (François Marie Arouet)
Letters on England, 6 (1732)

... a lot of the conflict in the world today is not between nations but between nations and people who feel they are commanded by God to shoot children and blow up buses.

— John C. Danforth, US Ambassador to the United Nations
The New York Times interview (September 13, 2004)

For who knows the will of God concerning this matter?

— Augustine of Hippo
The City of God, Book IV.7 (circa 413)

The “Cities of God” are religious “brands” (sects, churches, denominations, brotherhoods, orders, missions, movements, etc.) which seek to extend their religious influence over people. The “Countries of Earth” seek to keep law and order among the people within their boundaries (and beyond), and thus react in various ways towards the Cities of God depending on whether they are viewed as threats or benefits. *The interplay between religious brands and countries engenders religious regulation*. In Emile Durkheim’s terms (1938), religious brand activities which exercise constraints on people are a social ‘fact’ which must be considered to be just as real as the laws and policies of countries which constrain people.

This way of understanding the regulation of religious freedom is in harmony with the economic approach to understanding religion and society.² The economic approach, in the words of an early proponent of an alternative perspective, is one that sees “... that religion can no

² For an electronic bibliography of works related to the economic study of religion, see the “ERel Bibliography” at http://gunston.doit.gmu.edu/liannacc/ERel/S2-Archives/S24_Bibliography.htm

longer be imposed but must be marketed” (Berger, 1967:145). And if this is how religion works, a religious market can be regulated, deregulated (Finke 1990), monopolized, opened, etc.

The restriction of religious freedom (or regulation of religion) is important to a growing number of social scientists. One pressing need is for a more accurate regulation measure so that current research on the relationship of religion and economy can be extended (Barro and McCleary 2003:779). Though some useful international empirical analyses have been done (e.g., Chaves, Schraeder and Sprindys 1994), research on the effects of religious regulation will benefit greatly by having a reliable index of the regulation of religious freedom *that can be updated on a yearly basis*. Such an index is needed for a number of reasons.

First, as will be presented later in the analysis section of this paper, religious freedom has intriguing correlations with other social phenomena such as human development, conflict, legal policy, economics, and religious freedom over time. To discern whether religious freedom is a key predictor of other such phenomena is dependent upon having valid, reliable and updateable measures of religious freedom. Having a measure that can feasibly be updated annually and can even be extended backwards in time from this point fulfills one of the critical needs social scientists have for the generation of predictive models—over-time data. Considering the dynamic religious and political re-alliances (Jenkins 2002) which occurred after the global collapse of communism, annually updateable measures are sorely needed for those doing research related to the socio-religious situation of today.

Second, current quantitative measures are either limited in scope or theory. Freedom House has one of the best measures of religious freedom (Marshall 2000). Its measure has several limitations: it was a one-off study that will not be repeated; it ranks a convenience sample of only 74 countries on a scale of one to seven; and it does not account for the hegemonic (or

monopolistic) pursuits of religious brands in society. Its research instrument focuses primarily, if not exclusively, on the regulation of religions and beliefs by the governments of countries (op cit 334 ff.). The other main religious freedom rankings suffer from sundry deficiencies.

Operation World's *World Watch List* (2004) focuses only on restriction of Christianity. Oxford's *World Christian Encyclopedia* (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001) provides a categorical Religious Liberty Index. It is based on narrowly descriptive criteria which are not mutually exclusive. In spite of this, each country of the world is put into only one numeric category; this makes quantitative comparisons impossible. There is a useful pre-Cold War measure of global religious freedom (Bates 1945) that treats socio-religious hegemony as an *exogenous* variable. Though old, Bates' measure is not obsolete, as will be mentioned again later.

And third, an index of the restriction of religious freedom is needed because the international arena of the post-Cold War era is dominated by the "War on Terror." This is a politically sensitive way of saying that it is a war with certain Islamist religious brands which seek to oppose the current directions and orders of societies.³ An updateable index of religious freedom that takes into account the actions of religious brands would allow the development of explanatory, i.e., theory-driven, empirical models of the socio-religious and legal/policy forces which are shaping current history. The theory that drove Cold War perspectives on religious freedom was one where State Atheism was seen as an evil limit on religion and society (Senator McCarthy, 1950; President Reagan, 1982). Today, the theory must be revised to include, for example, how small a small religious brand such as Al Qaeda can take a world to war

³ Any religious brand is capable of terrorism. The current War, however, specifically involves Islamist terrorism. NB: The recognition of the Islamist tie to terrorism is one made by Muslims. "It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims" (al-Rashed 2004). Abdel Rahman al-Rashed is the general manager of the Arab satellite television station Al Arabiya. This quote appeared in the pan-Arab newspaper *Al Sharq al Awsat* and was cited by John Kifner of *The New York Times*.

(Ambassador Danforth 2004) and that religion, itself, has an ‘evil’ side (President Carter 1996).

It can be expected, then, that one occasion of religious violence⁴ is when a religious brand’s attempts to gain its desired market share in society are frustrated by the actions of other religious brands or by the legal/policy situation of a country.

This paper will describe the process used to create a measure of the worldwide regulation of religious freedom for 196 countries and regions for the period of July 1, 2002, to June 30, 2003. This same procedure can be used to create annual measures for religious freedom for each year since July 1996. It can be used to create an annual measure henceforth. And interestingly, it can be used to create measures for the early 1940s and the late 1970s.⁵

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The researcher interested in the social scientific study of international religion is confronted by two immediate challenges. First, survey data on societal attitudes on religion outside the more developed countries are comparatively limited in scope and of varying quality in spite of some good international social surveys such as the World Values Survey (WVS). While the WVS has many strong points, its methodology across 53 nations is not rigorously controlled. It is a confederated project of “equal partners” with each national research center carrying out the survey among a representative national sample of their own nation. “One consequence of this strategy of striving for inclusiveness has been that the quality of fieldwork

⁴ An understanding of religious violence must take into account the beliefs as well as market forces, since beliefs are often what is marketed. Peter Berger, quoting Albert Camus’s comments on Dostoyevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*, offers a more belief-oriented trigger of violence: “... man now ‘launches the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of justice’” (Berger, 1967:79).

⁵ The coding approach described herein can be used to retro-code the U.S. State Department Reports on International Religious Freedom which have been produced annually since 1997. In addition, the same coding scheme can be used to code the reports stored at Yale University which were produced in the 1940s and reported on by Prof. M. Searle Bates (1945). They can also be applied to information in the private archives of Dr. David M. Barrett’s 1970s global study of religion, stored at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, which resulted in the first edition (1982) of the *World Christian Encyclopedia* (knowing this possibility is based upon private correspondence with the World Christian Database director, Dr. Todd M. Johnson).

varies cross-nationally” (Inglehart et al 2000:6). I cannot claim that the data I will use does not also suffer from similar problems (as I will discuss), but it is important to note that one of the most highly used international social science survey data sources is limited to only a convenience sampling of nations and does not have the same level of methodological control as do major U.S. surveys such as the GSS.

Second, international social science survey data are affected by culture.⁶ Even when using well translated instruments, “the use of questionnaires and other self-report measures in non-Western, nonindustrialized cultures is risky business” (Behling and Law 2000:51) due to differences which may alter item or unit response in ways which bias the data.⁷ One way around this unsolved problem is to use non-reactive measures (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest and Grove 1966, 1981) such as coding laws on the books or dollars in the bank. Another commonly used alternative is a “survey” of experts,⁸ such as is done by Freedom House, the leading producer of measures on political, civil, and religious freedom (Karatnycky, Piano and Puddington 2003; Marshall, 2000). A combination of these two ways of generating such data is the coding of expert qualitative analysis (North and Gwin 2004). I use this last method to generate measures on international religious freedom for 196 different countries.

⁶ For example, in a recent national survey of Iraqi citizens (Oxford Research, 2004), while 46.9% of the respondents indicated that *issues of freedom* are an important component of democracy, on a question where 20 countries were offered as a potential model for a future Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (a confederation of royal sheikdoms officially favoring and promoting Islam) was favored by 21.1% as the model for Iraq, much more than favor the U.S. (6.5%). Even Saudi Arabia was favored by more people than was the United Kingdom as a model (3.6% versus 2.3%). These results indicate that an Iraqi citizen may have something very different in mind when he or she thinks of the notion of freedom and democracy than does an average Brit or American.

⁷ There is a nascent and growing body of literature which looks at differences between countries (e.g., de Leeus and de Heer 2002) as well as cultural differences which are between and within countries (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002). This research builds on a larger literature on cultural differences related to survey nonresponse in the US (e.g., Groves and Couper 1998).

⁸ The use of the term “survey” is confusing here since social scientists generally regard a survey to be “a systematic method for gathering information from (*a sample of*) entities for the purposes of constructing quantitative descriptors of the larger population of which the entities are members” [*italics mine*] (Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer and Tourangeau, 2004: 2). A survey of experts does not meet the normal understanding of a sample nor of being normal members of the larger population.

Nota Bene: Most freedom indexes (including religious, press, political, civil and economic) are set up with high scores indicating low freedom. In other words, ‘freedom indexes’ are measures of freedom restriction or deficiency. I follow this convention.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

A study on religious freedom must begin with the definition of terms because there are neither universally shared nor sufficiently precise definitions in the literature for ‘freedom,’ ‘religion,’ or ‘religious freedom.’ Without clear definitions, there can be no clear measures.

For freedom to exist, there must be a balance between commonweal and competition. Commonweal without competition is a failed communist experiment. Competition without commonweal is a cutthroat island. Drawing on Amartya Sen’s opportunity and process aspects of freedom (1999, 2002), I define *freedom* as follows:

Definition 1: *Freedom* is the ‘security’ provided by the dynamic social processes of commonweal-building and fair competition that make the ‘real opportunity’ for choice possible.

A ‘real opportunity’ for choice differs from a theoretical opportunity to the degree that people of similar situation actually make that choice. If the opportunity to do something is postulated but no one ever does it, the opportunity is not real. Glass Ceiling propositions exemplify this concept. Freedom is meaningless and well nigh impossible if there is no ‘security.’ The freedom to stroll down a dark street is not a meaningful freedom if the threat of being mugged is imminent.

To date, there is no agreed upon definition for the term *religion* among social scientists (Christiano, Swatos, and Kivisto 2002) or among those involved with Human Rights law (Lerner 2000). Most definitions erect a canopy so large that atheism and most college sororities would

qualify as religions. Broad definitions obfuscate rather than elucidate what religion is. When choosing between all-inclusive generality and narrow specificity, it is better to err on the side of specificity; otherwise, the concept of *religious freedom* cannot be distinguished from other freedoms such as those of speech, thought, and/or assembly.

Using elements from Rodney Stark's (2003) revision of the definition of religion offered in Stark and Finke (2000), I operationalize religion using a new term, *religious brand*.

Definition 2: A *religious brand* is an organized group of committed individuals that adhere to and propagate a specific interpretation of explanations of existence based on supernatural assumptions through statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning.

Two things are important to note. First, a religious brand is not an isolated individual's belief: it is an organized group that seeks to propagate its views. Second, a religious brand is not equivalent to a philosophy, i.e., religious brands make exclusive claims that rely on *supernatural* explanations of reality which transcend time and matter. A religious brand can take the form of a church or a sect (Weber 1968), a denomination (Wilson 1966), or a new religious movement outside of existing religious organizations (Barker 1984) or within them (Neitz 1987).

Religious freedom is less a matter of a person being able to choose a belief (or no belief), but more a matter of the unconstrained ability to make a choice for or against a particular religious brand without suffering negative social, civic or political consequences. The definition of religious freedom thus combines Definitions 1 and 2.

Definition 3: *Religious freedom* is the 'real opportunity' for religious brand choice within the security provided by the dynamic social processes of commonweal-building and fair religious brand competition.

The chief difference between religious freedom and freedom in general is that religious brands pursue security in this world as well as ‘the next.’ Competition is natural since religious brands have competing claims for how ‘eternal’ or ‘spiritual’ security is to be obtained. Thus, the commonweal aspect of ‘security’ does not come easily to religious brands due to the exclusive nature of their claims. They are often likely to see a competing religious brand as a threat rather than a sign of a healthy religious market. Allowing religious truth to be a matter of choice is often anathema to religious brands because it leads away from their understanding of divine truth and into possible eternal damnation. It is for such reasons that socio-religious hegemony is considered as a restrictor of religious freedom. Since *socio-religious hegemony* is a new concept, highlighting its definition with a bit of alliteration is helpful.

Definition 4: *Socio-Religious Hegemony* is the pursuit of religious brands for power, popularity, property, position, proselytes, provisos, and potentates at the expense of freedom for other religious brands.

DATA AND METHODS

THE DATA

My data on international religious freedom come from my quantitative coding of the reports on 196 countries⁹ covered in the US State Department’s 2003 annual *International Religious Freedom Report*, hereinafter referred to as “Reports.” The Reports became available on December 18, 2003, at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf. I use these data because of their fresh currency, breadth of coverage, incorporation of trend information, and depth of inquiry specifically related to religious freedom.

⁹ Countries or unique parts of countries, i.e., Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and Tibet are coded separately from China; the Occupied Territories are coded separately from Israel; and Western Sahara is coded separately from Morocco. Cyprus is coded as a single nation since it was reported as such.

In fulfillment of U.S. law, each U.S. Embassy prepares an annual Report on their host country. Reporting adheres to a common set of guidelines and training is given to Embassy staff who investigate the situation and prepare the Reports (see U.S. State Department 2003). Once an Embassy completes a Report, it is then vetted by various State Department offices with expertise in the affairs of that country and in human rights. The Reports also incorporate information from other human rights reports. The U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom also assists the State Department conduct research that feeds into these reports. They are then arranged and vetted under the supervision of the special U.S. Ambassador for International Religious Freedom. They cover the following standard reporting fields for each country: religious demography, legal/policy issues, restrictions of religious freedom, abuses of religious freedom, forced conversions, improvements in respect for religious freedom, societal attitudes, and the US Government's actions (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: International Religious Freedom Report Format (for each country)

<i>Introductory Overview</i> [untitled section]
1. Religious Demography
2. Status of Religious Freedom
a. Legal/Policy Framework
b. Restrictions on Religious Freedom
c. Abuses of Religious Freedom †
d. Forced Religious Conversion
e. Improvements in Respect for Religious Freedom ‡
3. Societal Attitudes
4. U.S. Government Policy

† Section is absent for countries with no reported abuses.

‡ Section is only present when improvements have been made since the last Report.

The Reports are a loosely structured, retrospective, qualitative analysis of most countries of the world with embedded quantitative data. The U.S. State Department has been compiling such annual Reports since 1997. In 2001, they took on the reporting format described above.

Though the Reports are bounded (July 1, 2002, to June 30, 2003), they include retrospective information on events that have been systematically monitored since 1997. Therefore, the data in these Reports approximate a trend study, which captures both recurring problems and specific problems that occurred during the reporting period. The Reports do not have a systematic interview or survey component, but some multi-modality is approximated in that, for example, Embassies are directly involved in inter-faith dialogs in various countries. The Reports do at times draw on local survey data unavailable to Western researchers.

The Reports are primarily produced by Embassy officials in country capitals and other cities with US Consulates, which limits their scope and may be a potential source of error. The Reports may also be biased by the groups with the loudest national voice. However, these problems are attenuated by the practice of the Reports to incorporate multiple sources of information (as mentioned above). Also, the data reflect a positive balance between *nearness* and *remoteness*. Expert analysis by trained staff resident in each country where the United States has an Embassy can be a definite strength. Theoretically, having observers different from the society being studied has merit. Georg Simmel made the argument for the *objectivity* of *differentness* in his essay on the social type of “the stranger.”

... the proportion of nearness and remoteness which gives the stranger the character of objectivity also finds practical expression in the more *abstract* nature of the relation to him. That is, with the stranger one has only certain *more general* qualities in common, whereas the relation with organically connected persons is based on the similarity of just those specific traits which differentiate them from the merely universal ([1908] 1971:146).

Problems such as *satisficing*, *social desirability response bias* (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003) and *nonresponse* (Curtin et al 2000; Groves et al. 1992; Keeter et al. 2000; Lin and Schaeffer 1995; Teitler, Reichman, and Sprachman 2003) are not a serious issue for these data. State-of-the-art survey methodology in the United States perennially wrestles with these

problems. For international survey data outside of industrialized nations where less research on research exists, these problems may have special and/or unidentified dimensions. For example, in countries where there is higher trust among strangers, like the USA, response may be higher and more truthful than in countries where trust of strangers is lower, like Japan (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). A serious problem for international survey research is that there are no statistically-proven methods to account for such cultural differences within and between countries. (See footnote 7 above.)

The varying length of country Reports should be noted. For example, the printed 2003 web Report for Indonesia is 14 pages long (single-spaced 10 pt. font) while many countries in the Caribbean have Reports of less than three pages. Rather than view the shorter Reports as a problem of *missing data*, the assumption in this study is that if abuses or restrictions were not reported, then they were negligible or nonexistent.¹⁰ While this assumption may be a source of error in the case of unreported or undiscovered abuses, there is some reason to believe that any unreported abuses were negligible due to the way the Reports are constructed (as discussed above).

The notable exceptions to this approach to missing data are the data coded from the Reports on North Korea, Libya, and Bhutan, where the U.S. State Department did not have an official presence during the reporting period. In the case of North Korea, the score provided in this study for that country cannot be considered reliable due to a lack of verifiable data from any international source. The situation may be worse (or better) in North Korea than the limited information reveals.

¹⁰ During coding, missing data were coded as system-missing. In the final data set, system-missing was recoded as whatever value represented the absence of a problem.

Another source of bias may be the over-reporting of problems in countries where information is readily accessible. For example, in countries with active Jewish human rights groups, firm statistics on anti-Semitism are more likely than in countries without such organizations. Therefore, it is possible that freer countries will appear worse than they are because abuses are freely reported. In spite of this potential bias, the Reports strive to make use of all information available to them from multiple on-the-ground sources. At times, the Reports try to put a good spin on bad situations in countries friendly to the U.S., Kuwait being such a case. These positive spins did not mean that actual abuses and restrictions went unreported; rather, there was less elaboration on them and more mention of positive situations to counterbalance the negative. Due to the approach to coding described below, it was possible to overcome the positive spin bias as is indicated, for example, by Kuwait's ranking on the RRF (30/196, reported in Appendix A).

In spite of such limitations, these Reports are the most comprehensive summary of the religious freedom situation in 196 'countries' of the world representing 99+ percent of the world's population. They form a good base of data that can be improved. A test of whether my measures reflect the bias of the State Department data is presented in Appendix C.

Finally, the informed reader may use the information provided in this article to make a quantitative estimate of the situation in the United States of America since the Reports do not include the U.S.¹¹

Quantitative Coding of the Data

The Reports were quantitatively coded using a 243-item *Codebook*, essentially a survey questionnaire, as the research instrument. The goal of the codebook was to create probes that

¹¹ If the State Department were to produce a Report on the U.S., its RRF Index score would away from the free end (0) considering the War on Terror, the U.S. Patriot Act, detention of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, etc.

would be useful in extracting quantitative information from the qualitative data. The first 225 questions follow the sections of the Reports summarized in Figure 3 above. Examples of these 225 questions are Measures 1, 4, and 7 in Appendix B. The last 18 questions of the Codebook were overall scales. Examples of these are Measures 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Appendix B.

The initial draft of the Codebook was developed based on my study of the 2001 and 2002 Reports. That draft contained less than 190 items. Two different coders and I used that first draft to code four different 2002 Reports. The Codebook went through two more revisions with eleven additional 2002 Reports being coded. This Codebook development process made use of cognitive interviewing techniques (Presser and Blair 1994) and the “Think-Aloud” strategy (e.g., Willis et al. 1999:3) to lay the groundwork for coder reliability and maximum data exploitation. Each coder independently decided on a rating for each of the items and then described his or her own decision-making processes. Areas of coder discrepancy were discussed at length. After agreeing on the criteria for a disputed item (by adjusting the Codebook item or discovering what we missed in the data), we then proceeded to the next item. Areas of incongruity most often related to question wording and were easily remedied. A number of useful items were added during this process, resulting in the final 243-item Codebook. This process facilitated reliable coding because these same raters were thus well trained and calibrated for the actual 2003 coding task. Coding took place from December 19, 2003, until February 17, 2004. I was the primary coder of all 196 countries. The two additional raters blind double-coded 142 of the 196 countries. Coding took an average of 45 minutes per country, with shorter Reports taking less than 30 minutes and longer Reports taking over 2 hours. Strict and consistent coding protocols were followed, including the requirement that no breaks were taken once coding of a country commenced. After the coders finished roughly a set of ten countries, the coders ‘re-calibrated’

by checking the results of the countries we coded in common. After data entry, the double codings were again examined as a check on my primary coding, which is the final set of scores used in the data set. Based on these procedures, inter-rater reliability was quite good, with Cronbach's alpha = .9047 on average for the 142 double coded countries.¹²

Table 1: Inter-rater Reliability

Cronbach's alpha for 142 double-coded countries	.9047
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All of the 243 items aim to be substantive measures (i.e., not subjective measures) in that they measure the increasing intensity of social attitudes, legal restrictions, etc. according to *substantive observations* of the qualitative data, and not according to the subjective interpretation or opinion of the coder. The task of the coders was to code what the Reports said.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INDEX: TWO COMPONENT INDEXES

Of the 243 variables, 14 were chosen to form the RRF Index. The rationale for inclusion were that the measures had to form scales with sufficient triangulation (Denzin 1970) which empirically loaded onto the two constructs central to the restriction of religious freedom: (1) the *Socio-Religious Hegemonic* practices of religious brands, and (2) the *Legal/Policy Regulation of Religious Freedom* by countries. This section describes these measures and performs several statistical tests to see whether the measures chosen are empirically defensible.

¹² For such coding, .8 and above is conventionally acceptable. All string variables and large number items (e.g., population counts) were removed before testing inter-rater reliability.

Socio-Religious Hegemony Index¹³

The *Socio-Religious Hegemony* index is composed of two scales and one index:¹⁴ *Anti-Brand Movements*, *Conflict with Other Brands*, and *Negativity to Other Brands*. The common element in these measures is that they present data on socio-religious forces that constrain religious freedom by seeking to dominate the religious ‘market,’ so to speak.

Anti-Religious Brand Movements (Measure 2 in Appendix B) identifies two different types of such social movements. Anti-religious brand movements of the first type aim to protect an existing order by campaigning against religious brands viewed as a threat. Such movements often target religious brands such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, which do not pledge national flags. The second type of anti-religious brand movement opposes a secular ordering of society and seeks to establish hegemony over the country or some part of the country. Examples of this type are the numerous movements to adopt Shari’a Law throughout the world as well as Hindutva movements in India. Such movements violate religious freedom in that they are premised on ensuring security only for their favored religious brand(s). Rather than promote real religious brand choice, such movements seek to circumscribe choice.

Conflict with Other Brands (Measure 3 in Appendix B) captures the varying levels of societal attitudes which impinge upon religious freedom, i.e., attitudes which demonstrate a one-

¹³ Socio-religious hegemony is revealed in attitudes towards other religious brands. One of the starkest indicators of hegemonic socio-religious activities is violence towards other religious brands. Violence *related to religion* occurred in more than 100 different countries in recent years, including 71 countries where abuses included assault, beatings, rape, torture, murder, or armed conflict. (Numbers reported are from my quantitative coding of the International Religious Freedom Reports.) Such abuses range from isolated violent acts to simmering states of stalemated war, e.g., Armenia versus Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, to unrelenting bloody conflict, e.g., the Intifada in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Another indicator of socio-religious hegemony is the extent of anti-religious brand movements in a country. When a religious brand stimulates social movements that seek to obtain hegemony for their religious brand or campaign against other religious brands, they do so to gain *security* for themselves at the expense of the security of other brands. Specifically, they *oppose real choice*. Such social movements were present in over 125 countries. Yet another indicator of socio-religious hegemony is the type of bias a religious brand has towards other religious brands, such as whether it tries to shut out other religious brands, prevent proselytism, or forbid conversions to other religions. Such biases were reported to varying degrees in 140 different countries

¹⁴ See Babbie (2000) for the distinction between a scale and an index. An ideal index approximates a scale.

sided pursuit of security. The subjective nature of these attitudes is reflected in the first two levels of this scale. Prejudice (level 2), for example, is sometimes captured directly in the Reports. For example, in the Societal Attitudes section of the Report on Iceland, there is no ambiguity for the coder: “If members of religious minorities face discrimination, it is more indirect in nature, taking the form of prejudice and lack of interfaith or intercultural understanding” (U.S. State Department 2003: Iceland). Iceland was coded as “2,” which on the scale incorporates level 1, inadvertent insensitivity to other religious brands than the dominant religious brand (Lutheranism). Levels 3-6 on the scale reflect the substantive (documented) categories of discrimination, aggression, fatal aggression and war based on religious brand.

The third measure of *Socio-Religious Hegemony* is *Negativity to Other Brands* (Measure 4 in Appendix B). This additive index captures specific attitudes within society towards other religious brands. It includes items measuring the views of minority religious brands, relations between religious brands, attitudes toward conversions to other religious brands, and other forms of negative exclusivity. Such attitudes reflect whether religious brands feel that their security is threatened by other religious brands. Attitudes especially towards conversion and proselytism are indicators of religious brand hegemony which reflect whether there is real choice. This measure is an additive index of five separate observations on each country, which function well together as a scale ($\alpha = .7886$).

Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all the measures that are used to make up the *Socio-Religious Hegemony* index. Cronbach’s alpha for the three composite measures is very strong (.8663), indicating that it would be appropriate to use them as components of a single *Socio-Religious Hegemony* scale.

Table 2: Socio-Religious Hegemony Index (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

		N	Range	Mean	Std. Dev.
Observed Measures alpha = .8663	Anti-Brand Movements	196	0 – 6	2.44	2.384
	Conflict with Other Brands	196	0 – 6	2.99	1.948
	Negativity to Other Brands	196	0 – 6 †	1.90	1.683
Components of “Negativity to Other Brands” alpha = .7886	A. Religious biases	196	0 – 4	4.12	3.640
	B. Religious relations	196	0 – 4	1.37	1.296
	C. Conversion attitudes	196	0 – 3	0.73	1.016
	D. Proselytizing attitudes	196	0 – 1	0.27	0.443
	F. Hegemonic activities	196	0 – 1	0.49	0.501
	Negativity to Other Brands raw	196	0 – 13 †	4.12	3.640

† (Negativity to Other Brands raw * .461538) = 0-6 scale.

Legal/Policy Regulation Index¹⁵

The *Legal/Policy Regulation* index is composed of two scales and one index: *Restrictions on Brands*, *Legal/Policy Impetus* and *Macro Legal System*. The common element in these measures is that they present data on the restrictions that a country’s legal/policy framework places upon religious brands.

The first two scales of the *Legal/Policy Regulation* index are interrelated, but they measure distinct aspects of the legal/policy framework. *Restrictions on Brands* (Measure 5 in Appendix B) is a measure of the level of restrictions a government places on religion and religious brands. It ranges from 0 (no restrictions reported) to 6 (prohibition of religious practice except for that which is approved by the government).

¹⁵ Religious freedom is diminished when the *legal and policy framework* of a country limits choice and saps the process of all religious brands being able to pursue security by favoring (subsidizing) or restricting (regulating) religious brand activity. The extreme form this can take is when governments campaign against certain religious brands or *sects*, as the smaller religious brands are derisively called. This occurred in 69 different countries of the world in 2002-2003. (Numbers reported are from my quantitative coding of the International Religious Freedom Reports.) Campaigns include such things as the stigmatization of Scientology in Germany, whose Economics and Labor Ministry required that an “S” be placed in government records beside the names of firms suspected of employing members of the Church of Scientology. More violent campaigns include the imprisonment and torture of Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Uzbekistan. Such anti-religious brand campaigns can also include refusing to recognize the religious brand leaders elected by the brand’s members, such as Israel’s refusal to recognize the duly elected Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Israel, Eirinaios I. Less dramatic forms of regulation are rampant. For example, governments of 101 different countries have offices charged with supervising or overseeing religious brands. Similar in effect to regulation is subsidy of religious brands. 119 different countries subsidize religion in one form or another, including Venezuela, which disburses State funds directly to the Catholic Church.

The *Legal/Policy Impetus* scale (Figure 2 above and Measure 6 in Appendix B), taps into the motivations beneath the *Restrictions on Brands* scale. It also taps into the social moods that motivate laws on religion. This scale is discussed at length in Appendix B.

The third measure of *Legal/Policy Regulation* is *Macro Legal Systems* (Measure 7 in Appendix B). This measure represents the legal and policy safeguards for religious freedom in a country. While it includes the presence of Constitutional guarantees, it focuses primarily on how well these guarantees are actualized, including whether there is an official religious bias, e.g., a State religion. It is an additive index composed of five measures (A-E in Table 2) which function passably together as a scale (alpha = .6874).¹⁶ *Macro Legal System* also taps into the strength of laws which mitigate conflict between religious brands.

Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the measures that are used to make up the *Legal/Policy Regulation* latent measure. Cronbach's alpha for the three composite measures is very strong (.8617), indicating that it would be appropriate to use them as components of a single *Legal/Policy Regulation* scale.

Table 3: Legal/Policy Regulation of Religious Freedom (Observed Measure Descriptive Statistics)

		N	Range	Mean	Std. Dev.
Observed Measures alpha = .8617	Restrictions on Brands	196	0 – 6	3.20	2.030
	Legal/Policy Impetus	196	0 – 6	3.45	2.149
	Macro Legal System	196	0 – 6 †	1.38	1.374
Components of “ <i>Macro Legal System</i> ” alpha = .6874	A. Constitution present	196	0 – 2	0.16	0.479
	B. Right of religious freedom	196	0 – 2	0.29	0.658
	C. Officially favored religion	196	0 – 2	0.69	0.865
	D. Religious freedom protected	196	0 – 3	0.87	0.861
	E. Protected at all govt. levels	196	0 – 2	0.53	0.838
	Macro Legal System raw	196	0 – 11 †	2.54	2.518


† (Macro Legal System raw * .5454545) = 0-6 scale.

¹⁶ The *Macro Legal System* alpha score (.6874) is close enough to the conventional value of .70 to be accepted, especially considering the overall *high* alpha score (.8617) when combined with the other two Legal/Policy scales (reported in Table 3) and empirical factor loading (below in Figure 2).

FACTOR ANALYSES

Factor analysis provides a test of whether the above two components are actually separate dimensions of the restriction of religious freedom. Principle Component Analysis (rotating using Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization) tests whether the six observed variables are divided into two distinct factors. The results are presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis



The coordinates and eigenvalues associated with Figure 2 are summarized in Table 4. Since both eigenvalues are greater than one, there is strong evidence to accept that these six variables form two distinct factors.

Table 4. Rotated Component Matrix (Rotation converged in 3 iterations)

		Components	
		1	2
Socio-Religious Hegemony	Negativity to Other Brands	.360	.836
	Conflict with Other Brands	.233	.888
	Anti-Brand Movements	.419	.772
Legal/Policy Restrictions	Macro Legal System	.788	.369
	Restrictions on Religious Brands	.882	.266
	Legal/Policy Impetus	.870	.232
Eigenvalues for components		3.232	1.135

INDEX CALCULATIONS

An index of the restriction of religious freedom (RRF) is calculated using a two-step process. First, the *Socio-Religious Hegemony* and *Legal/Policy Regulation* indexes for each country are simply calculated by adding their component measures (range of 0-18 for each). Second, the RRF index for each country is calculated adding a weighted version of these two indexes together. The two raw scores are weighted by the strength of each index's correlation with an actual indication of the level of *Abuses due to Low Religious Freedom* (Measure 1 in Appendix B). For economy of space, the description of this measure and its rationale is in Appendix B.

The correlation between *Socio-Religious Hegemony* and *Abuses due to Low Religious Freedom* is .688 ($p < .001$). The correlation between *Legal/Policy Regulation* and *Abuses due to Low Religious Freedom* is .587 ($p < .001$). The correlations of each factor with *Abuses due to Low Religious Freedom* is used to weight their impact on actual abuses. The results are presented in Appendix A.

Formula 1: Weighted Index according to Correlation to Religious Freedom Abuses

$$(Restriction\ of\ Religious\ Freedom\ Index): \quad RRF = (SRH * .688) + (LPR * .587)$$

CORRELATIONS

For an index to be accepted, it must demonstrate that it relates to other related measures in logical ways. I evaluate the RRF Index and its two component indexes by looking at their correlation with a number of measures of freedom and development.

Reliability-related Correlations

To interpret the correlations reported in Table 5 correctly, it must be remembered that freedom indexes are actually measures of the restriction or diminishment of freedom (high scores mean low freedom). *N* is the number of cases (countries) with data that can be compared.

Table 5. Correlations with the Restriction of Religious Freedom Index (RRF) & its Components

	RRF Index	RRF Component Factors		N
		Socio-Religious Hegemony	Legal/Policy Regulation	
Religious Freedom Scale: Freedom House 2000	.735***	.576***	.763***	74
Press Freedom Ranking: Reporters sans frontieres 2003	.558***	.402***	.646***	164
Political Rights Scale: Freedom House 2003	.535***	.423***	.566***	196
Civil Liberties Scale: Freedom House 2003	.597***	.486***	.614***	196
Economic Freedom: Heritage/Wall Street Journal 2004	.324***	.289***	.303***	156
GNI (Purchasing Power Parity \$): World Bank 2003	-.168*	-.163*	-.137	158
Human Development Index: United Nations 2002	-.156*	-.167*	-.110	193
Armed Conflict: Project Ploughshares 1988-2002 †	.397***	.413***	.294***	196
Religious Liberty Scale: Searle Bates 1945 ††	.535***	.489***	.487***	78
"Religious Freedom" describes our country very well.‡	.174	.133	.174	31
Abuse Due to Low Relig. Freedom (Meas. 1, Appx. B)	.709***	.688***	.587***	196
*** p < .001; * p < .05 (two-tailed significance level)				
† Recoding of data (Ploughshares 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Regehr 2001)				
†† Recoded data (Bates 1945:546-47)				
‡ Percentage of respondents answering 'yes' in countries sampled (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2003)				

First, as would be expected, the RRF's highest correlation is with Freedom House's religious freedom scale (.735), giving evidence that the RRF is a reliable measure. The *Legal/Policy Regulation* component of the RRF correlates more strongly with Freedom House's religious freedom scale (.763) presumably because Freedom House treated legal/policy regulations as the main restrictor of religious freedom. That the RRF and the Freedom House's

religious freedom scale still correlate highly may be due to the unmeasured impact of socio-religious hegemony upon the legal/policy regulations a country enacts.

Second, the strength of RRF's correlations with other freedom measures supports the proposition that freedoms come as a bundled commodity (Griswold 2004; Sen 1999). The overall RRF correlates positively with all the freedom measures, giving further evidence that the RRF is a reliable measure. Its slightly stronger correlation with Civil Liberties restriction (.597) than with Press Freedom restriction (.558) or Political Rights restriction (.535) is logical in that Civil Liberties reflect the social processes of a country more than Press Freedom or Political Rights. The RRF positively correlates with Economic Freedom restriction (.324). The connection between the RRF and Economic Freedom is further demonstrated by the significant and *negative* relationships between the RRF and GNI (-.168) and the Human Development Index (-.156), both of which are positive measures of economic strength, whereas the RRF is a measure of religious freedom weakness. The significance of these correlations disappears when *only* the *Legal/Policy Regulation* component of the RRF is considered. This is logical because the RRF is a measure of what people are socially prevented from doing more than it is a measure of what the government *tries* to prevent them from doing.

Finally, the reliability of the RRF is supported by the very similar way in which it and Freedom House's religious freedom scale significantly correlate with *Abuse Due to Low Religious Freedom* (.709 and .720, respectively) as shown in Table 6. The correlations with Freedom House's measure and the *Abuse* measure give evidence that the RRF is a reliable measure.

Other Interesting Correlations

The correlations also indicate that the RRF offers new information not contained in other current measures of the restriction of religious, economic, political and civic freedoms. It appears that a *measure of religious freedom offers **new knowledge** in that it is distinct from other freedom measures*. This distinction can be seen by looking at how the various freedom measures correlate with each other. The other measures most likely tap into a common driver, i.e., legal/policy regulation, while the RRF also taps into socio-religious drivers. This is seen by the three correlations in **bold** in Table 6. The RRF captures the difference between restriction of Political Rights (.535) and restriction of Civil Liberties (.597), *in spite of* the high correlation between those two measures (.934).

Table 6. Correlations between current Freedom Measures

	RRF	Religious Freedom (Freedom House)	Press Freedom Ranking	Political Rights Scale	Civil Liberties Scale	Economic Freedom	Abuse due to Low Rel. Freedom
RRF	1						
Relig. Freedom (Freedom House)	.735	1					
Press Freedom Ranking	.558	.809	1				
Political Rights Scale	.535	.823	.764	1			
Civil Liberties Scale	.597	.827	.799	.934	1		
Economic Freedom	.324	.752	.637	.669	.735	1	
Abuse Due to Low Rel. Freedom	.709	.720	.575	.512	.544	.422	1

All correlations significant at $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

In addition, the RRF is uniquely correlated with the restriction of Economic Freedom (.324). Of the five freedom measures in Table 6, only the RRF correlates below .600 with Economic Freedom. This suggests that the restriction of religious freedom may be less powerfully associated with the restriction of economic freedom than are the restriction of Press, Political or Civil Freedoms. While the RRF demonstrates this weaker relationship, the Freedom House Religious Freedom ranking does not. Certainly religious and economic freedoms are

correlated, but it is possible to have low restriction of economic freedom with high restriction of religious freedom. To see this in operation, one only has to walk down the aisles of the palatial shopping malls and bustling bazaars of the religiously restrictive Arab countries perched on the Persian Gulf. This may be the reason that religious freedom issues often get the short shrift in international human rights, for after all, money makes the world go round. Or does it?

Looking back to Table 5, it is interesting that the restriction of religious freedom correlates positively with armed conflict (.397). While this does not speak directly to the reliability of this measure, it would be surprising if such a correlation were not present. The lower correlation between armed conflict and the *Legal/Policy* component of the RRF (.294) indicates that understanding the correlation of Socio-Religious Hegemonic restriction of religious freedom with armed conflict (.413) may contribute important information in understanding the wars that spin the globe. Certainly the recent failures of the Intelligence Agencies of the United States and its allies are more understandable in light of the overwhelming dearth of data on international socio-religious phenomena.

It is also of interest that the restriction of religious freedom in a country tends to be consistent over time, i.e., it correlates positively over time. This is seen in the significant, strong and positive correlation (.535) between the RRF and Bates' 1945 Religious Liberty Scale shown in Table 5. This indicates that these forces have been operating for some time and it is not just the collapse of the USSR that triggered their reemergence. The Communist Block ironically played a positive role as global restrictor of the violent socio-religious hegemonic forces wreaking havoc in today's world. By seeking to control all religion, the evil empire (President Ronald Reagan's term, 1982) did contain religion's evil side (President Jimmy Carter's term,

1996). Again, while this does not speak directly to the reliability of this measure, it would be surprising if such a correlation were not present since religious loyalties are slow to change.

One final correlation statistic of interest is actually the lack of an expected correlation. Citizens' assessment of religious freedom in a country as measured by an existing international survey is poorly correlated (.174) with the RRF (Table 5). It is not only insignificantly correlated with the actual level of religious freedom restriction, it is also in the *opposite* direction than expected. Remembering that a high RRF scores mean low freedom, this positive correlation runs in the counter to expectations, i.e., citizens who think that "religious freedom" describes their country very well is correlated positively with the *restriction* of religious freedom, not with religious freedom. Considering the previous discussion on problems with international survey data, these contradictory findings are not entirely surprising. Citizens' assessments of religious freedom are not significantly related to the actual level of religious freedom restriction.

DISCUSSION OF THE RRF INDEX

The RRF Index reflects the real opportunity for religious brand choice that is possible within the security provided by the dynamic social processes of commonweal-building and fair religious brand competition. Freedom for the majority to do what they want is not the measurement provided. Rather, the RRF is a measure of the restriction of freedom that various religious brands in a country experience. And this restriction emanates not just from government actions, but also from the actions of other religious brands against them or against the government. A discussion of a four general examples is useful.

First, RRF component scores are especially useful in revealing the tenuous situation in countries where there is both high socio-religious hegemony *and* high legal/policy regulations. In the case of Iraq, it was the bloody *Legal/Policy Regulations* on religious freedom under the

former regime that kept the bloodletting forces of *Socio-Religious Hegemony* from spilling into the streets. Now that the restrictions have been eased, such violence is on the rise. The bombing of mosques by rival religious brands is one fatal example. The success of current country-building endeavors by the U.S. is dependent on the parties within Iraq allowing real religious brand choice.

Second, the RRF component scores importantly highlight potential areas of progress in removing unnecessary legal/policy restrictions on religious freedom. The most notable finding in this regard is for the country ranked 64/196 on the RRF—the People’s Republic of China. While China has oppressive legal/policy regulations on religion (14.73), there is relatively moderate restriction by socio-religious hegemony (7.69). Using Formula 1, China’s overall score is 13.94. This score indicates that people in China often have the opportunity to make their own religious brand choices. The phenomenal growth of religion in China (Aikman 2003; Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2001) attests to the validity of this finding. Scholars rightly debate the numbers (Jenkins 2002), but none debate the growth. The Chinese Government officially acknowledges that there are now more than 200 million religious adherents with more than 100,000 sites for religious activity and 300,000 clergy (cited in U.S. State Department Report on China 2003). There is “relative” religious freedom in China because the general social attitude is quite positive to religious brand choice. This general positive attitude by Chinese society to religious freedom is reflected in the extremely good RRF scores of China-Hong Kong (2.99) and China-Taiwan (0.59). These data suggest that Mainland Chinese society can handle religious freedom. If Beijing accepts this, as Taiwan and Hong Kong have, the security generated will produce a stronger commonweal. While there are hegemonic socio-religious forces in China, e.g., in Tibet and Xinjiang, loosening religious restrictions seems a risk worth taking, especially

considering the overwhelmingly positive reaction that will come from the international community. Interestingly, in 1945 China was ranked as one of the freest countries in the world regarding religion (Bates 1945). The evidence suggests that this could happen again.

Third, a note on countries generally viewed as free is useful. Canada, for example, is more or less in the middle of the pack (98/196 on the RRF Index). Why is it there and not closer to the free end of the index? It could be due to the potential bias mentioned before where generally free countries are more apt to reveal abuses than are less free countries. As mentioned previously, the State Department may have had access to more information in Canada than it did in Mongolia (number 97/196), and thus Canada's score relative to Mongolia is biased. If this is true, it does not necessarily mean that Canada's score should change. Rather, it might be that a better measure for Mongolia is needed. Having said this, let me highlight the types of information that went into Canada's RRF score (8.85). The Canada Report cites a survey released in September 2002 where 60 percent of Canadian Muslims said that they had experienced discrimination or bias since September 2001. Among other things, the Report also cited 459 instances of anti-Semitism during the Report period, of which 39 percent involved violence to property or persons, including a religiously-related murder in Toronto. In addition, pro-Palestinian riots erupted in connection with a visit by former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Montreal. Coding this information puts Canada at 5 on the *Conflict with Other Brands* scale, 3 on the *Anti-Brand Movements* scale, and 1.38 on the *Negativity to Other Brands* additive index. Thus Canada's *Socio-Religious Hegemony* score is 9.38. The component of the RRF that more closely relates to other freedoms is its *Legal/Policy Regulation* component. On that scale, Canada scores relatively low (4.09, where low=free). Because of this, the general public perception of religious freedom would naturally be greater than the freedom experienced

by those out of the mainstream. The RRF score for Canada may seem accurate, however, when looked at from a Muslim or Jewish perspective. This discussion is not to single out Canada, but it serves to explain other similar scores which run counter to common expectations. The current pressures of Islamist religious brands upon U.S. policy and public opinion show how the demand for security after religious brand aggression results in higher legal/policy restrictions on religious brands. The news-making detention of Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) who was taken off a diverted trans-Atlantic flight by U.S. officials on September 22, 2004, due to his religious brand associations is an anecdotal example of the potential swing away from religious freedom in the U.S. today (reported in BBC News 2004).

Much more could be discussed, but one final example where this new understanding of religious freedom is useful is in the struggle against tyranny. Since legal/policy restrictions on religion are often a reactive force, this lends support to arguments in favor of the *lasting efficacy* of nonviolent resistance. Foreign occupiers may be scared away by bombings, but when national sovereignty is violently threatened, those with power respond with equal force, as is being played out at present in Russia's reaction to Chechan (Muslim) separatists terrorizing the schools, subways and airways of predominantly Orthodox Russia. The self-restraint of the Kurds wins them international support. The silent protests of Falun Gong put more pressure on China to change than do the bus bombs of Uygur separatists. History is replete with examples. Karol Wojtyla's moral resistance to atheist hegemony in Poland toppled an empire. Gandhi's nonviolence created an independent India. Martin Luther King's prayerful peace marches indelibly changed the most powerful country on earth. They were successful because their peaceful passion showed a better way. There is truth in the adage that *violence begets violence*.

In an age of global concern for human rights including religious rights, persistent nonviolence is too often want for wear. Were it more worn, the Palestinians may have had a State years ago.

CONCLUSION

This analysis takes into account that religious freedom is restricted by the socio-religious pursuits of religions themselves as well as by the legal/policy regulation of religion by countries. The stronger correlation of socio-religious hegemonic pursuits of religious brands than legal/policy regulations to actual *abuses* of religions freedom indicates that socio-religious forces must be included in any discussion of religious freedom and religious regulation. Using this information, I have calculated an index of the restriction of religious freedom for 196 countries that has empirical strength and correlational reliability. Moreover, this methodology can be applied to past (since 1997) and future (produced annually) U.S. State Department Reports on international religious freedom to generate over-time data. The same coding scheme can be applied to other studies to give measures for the 1940s (using Bates 1945 data including Yale archives) and the 1970s (using Barrett's 1982 data including Gordon-Conwell archives). This is a research agenda which seems important to pursue.

I have also shown that the restriction of religious freedom correlates positively with the restriction of other freedoms such as freedom of the press and political freedom. These and other intriguing correlations are worth further exploration. For example, the restriction of religious freedom correlates strongly and positively with armed conflict, meaning that an understanding of how religious freedom is regulated is useful in the pursuit of peace. I have also presented some evidence that restriction of religious freedom in a country tends to be consistent over time. Lasting changes in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq require socio-religious change and not

just legal/policy (regime) change. And of course, the study relation of the relation between religion and economy can only benefit from improved measures on international religion.

I have drawn attention to a largely neglected but good source of data on international religious freedom—the U.S. State Department’s annual International Religious Freedom Reports. I have also shown that such government data sources can be used without succumbing to all their particular biases. I have demonstrated innovative methods for the study of international religion, including creating an entirely new and original data set with more than 240 variables related to religion for 196 countries of the world, which will be made available to the public at the American Religion Data Archive (www.TheARDA.com). Finally, I have offered definitions that make it possible to conduct better analysis of international religious phenomena.

I was unable to show a statistical correlation between the actual level of religious freedom and citizens’ assessment of religious freedom in a country as measured by an existing international survey. This indicates that there need to be more, better and varied measures of religious freedom if we are to understand how religious dynamics are at work in the world today, as well as increased development of international survey research beyond the industrialized nations. The Oxford Research study in Iraq (2004) is an example of one such advance.

Not only do governments have an effect on the restriction of religious freedom, but so do the hegemonic socio-religious activities of religious brands, themselves, which surround individuals from cradle to grave (and beyond, according to the beliefs of religious brands). The Cities of God watch over the eternal destinies of people. The Countries of Earth watch over the four score years people walk the planet. This distinction separates religious freedom from all other types of freedoms.

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Appendix A: Restriction of Religious Freedom (RRF) Index

RRF = (SRH*.688) + +(LPR*.587)				
<i>Italics</i> indicates that the U.S. State Department Report summary listed this country or a part of it as a concern. † Scores based on limited Report data		RRF Index	Component Indexes	
		Regulation of Religious Freedom	Socio-Religious Hegemony	Legal/Policy Regulation
Rank	Country or Region	RRF	SRH	LPR
1	Saudi Arabia	22.95	18	18
2	Afghanistan	21.35	17.54	15.82
3	Azerbaijan	21.03	17.54	15.27
4	Iraq	21.03	17.54	15.27
5	Burma	20.77	16.62	15.91
6	Indonesia	20.50	17.54	14.36
7	Algeria	20.40	15.69	16.36
8	Tunisia	20.35	15.62	16.36
9	Israeli Occupied Territories	20.13	16.62	14.82
10	Iran	19.97	16	15.27
11	Sudan	19.86	17.54	13.27
12	Pakistan	19.49	17	13.27
13	India	19.43	17	13.18
14	Somalia	19.40	14.62	15.91
15	Cyprus	19.12	16.15	13.64
16	Bhutan †	18.33	12.69	16.36
17	Maldives	18.29	13.08	15.82
18	Comoros	18.11	14.15	14.27
19	Belarus	18.07	13.23	15.27
20	Egypt	18.06	14.15	14.18
21	Armenia	17.90	14.77	13.18
22	Nigeria	17.57	15.15	12.18
23	Israel	17.49	12.77	14.82
24	Yemen	17.48	13.69	13.73
25	Eritrea	17.38	12.23	15.27
26	Georgia	17.36	15.69	11.18
27	Russia	17.30	15.69	11.09
28	Congo, Democratic Republic	16.95	12.38	14.36
29	Bangladesh	16.95	13.31	13.27
30	Kuwait	16.84	13.23	13.18
31	Central African Republic	16.68	13.77	12.27
32	Ethiopia	16.67	15.62	10.09
33	Colombia	16.52	11.92	14.18
34	Qatar	16.47	11.77	14.27
35	Turkmenistan	16.43	10.85	15.27
36	Sri Lanka	16.31	13.77	11.64
37	Malaysia	16.25	13.69	11.64
38	Turkey	16.10	12.69	12.55
39	United Arab Emirates	15.83	11.69	13.27
40	Jordan	15.83	11.69	13.27
41	Uganda	15.77	15.62	8.55
42	Cote d'Ivoire	15.45	13.77	10.18
43	Cuba	15.42	9.38	15.27
44	Vietnam	15.42	9.38	15.27
45	Morocco	15.39	13.69	10.18
46	Western Sahara †	15.39	13.69	10.18
47	Bahrain	15.30	11.77	12.27
48	Libya †	15.05	7.92	16.36
49	Chad	15.08	14.62	8.55
50	Cameroon	15.08	14.62	8.55
51	China-Tibet †	14.63	8.23	15.27
52	Syria	14.55	11.69	11.09
53	Tanzania	14.34	11.77	10.64
54	Mauritania	14.32	6.85	16.36

55	Guinea	14.29	11.31	11.09
56	Bulgaria	14.19	9.77	12.73
57	Uzbekistan	14.19	9.38	13.18
58	Bosnia-Herzegovina	14.12	12.69	9.18
59	Croatia	14.12	12.69	9.18
60	Liberia	14.09	9.69	12.64
61	Nepal	14.07	11.77	10.18
62	Kenya	14.02	12.15	9.64
63	East Timor	13.95	14.23	7.09
64	China	13.94	7.69	14.73
65	Niger	13.65	11.15	10.18
66	Greece	13.34	9.85	11.18
67	Lebanon	13.12	10.77	9.73
68	Austria	13.12	11.31	9.09
69	Korea, North †	12.73	5	15.82
70	Argentina	12.64	11.85	7.64
71	Brunei	12.62	4.85	15.82
72	Equatorial. Guinea	12.55	7.92	12.09
73	Italy	12.43	10.31	9.09
74	Oman	12.04	4.85	14.82
75	Romania	11.85	9.85	8.64
76	Tajikistan	11.64	7.92	10.55
77	Ukraine	11.52	10.69	7.09
78	Guatemala	11.36	10.92	6.55
79	Malawi	11.30	11.31	6
80	Mexico	11.18	13.62	3.09
81	Serbia & Montenegro	10.94	9.85	7.09
82	Palau	10.89	9.38	7.55
83	Kyrgyzstan	10.74	8.31	8.55
84	Nauru	10.63	6.77	10.18
85	Djibouti	10.49	5.31	11.64
86	Jamaica	10.37	7.31	9.09
87	Netherlands	10.30	9.85	6
88	Monaco	10.22	5.77	10.64
89	France	9.81	10.38	4.55
90	Zimbabwe	9.79	4.38	11.55
91	Laos	9.63	5.31	10.18
92	Rwanda	9.58	4	11.64
93	United Kingdom	9.51	6.85	8.18
94	Congo, Republic of	9.51	7	8
95	Cambodia	9.21	3.92	11.09
96	Hungary	9.19	7.31	7.09
97	Mongolia	9.19	7.77	6.55
98	Canada	8.85	9.38	4.09
99	Nicaragua	8.82	6	8
100	Germany	8.77	5.38	8.64
101	Japan	8.72	5.38	8.55
102	Switzerland	8.72	5.85	8
103	Norway	8.50	6.31	7.09
104	Venezuela	8.45	5.46	8
105	Lithuania	8.41	4.77	8.73
106	Singapore	8.30	4.31	9.09
107	Spain	8.23	6.38	6.55
108	Czech Republic	8.23	6.85	6
109	Vanuatu	8.19	6.31	6.55
110	Fiji	8.11	10.46	1.55
111	Peru	8.04	3	10.18
112	Finland	7.98	3.85	9.09
113	Slovenia	7.81	5.77	6.55
114	Brazil	7.75	7.85	4
115	Iceland	7.67	2.92	9.64
116	Australia	7.64	8.85	2.64
117	S. Africa	7.58	8.46	3
118	Samoa	7.48	7.85	3.55
119	Papua New Guinea	7.48	8.31	3

120	Belgium	7.28	6.31	5
121	Haiti	7.08	3.46	8
122	Denmark	7.03	2.46	9.09
123	Philippines	6.99	9.31	1
124	Macedonia	6.94	8.31	2.09
125	Trinidad and Tobago	6.86	4	7
126	Mauritius	6.86	4.85	6
127	Moldova	6.76	2.92	8.09
128	Slovak Republic	6.74	5.92	4.55
129	Ghana	6.74	5.92	4.55
130	Andorra	6.51	0	11.09
131	Chile	6.49	2.92	7.64
132	Swaziland	6.30	0	10.73
133	Dominican Republic	6.02	1	9.09
134	Bolivia	5.95	4.31	5.09
135	Panama	5.91	3	6.55
136	Mali	5.79	5	4
137	Senegal	5.70	1.46	8
138	Gabon	5.69	4	5
139	San Marino	5.66	0	9.64
140	Kazakhstan	5.54	2	7.09
141	Cape Verde	5.53	2.92	6
142	Angola	5.47	4.92	3.55
143	Saint Lucia	5.40	7.85	0
144	Albania	5.40	7.85	0
145	Malta	5.34	0	9.09
146	Togo	5.28	0	9
147	Latvia	5.22	2	6.55
148	Surinam	5.10	4.85	3
149	Sweden	5.04	6.85	0.55
150	New Zealand	4.90	2	6
151	Costa Rica	4.85	1	7.09
152	Solomon Islands	4.73	4.31	3
153	Botswana	4.70	0	8
154	Poland	4.66	6.31	0.55
155	Burkina Faso	4.66	6.77	0
156	Ecuador	4.63	2	5.55
157	Tuvalu	4.56	5.31	1.55
158	Paraguay	4.51	4.85	2
159	Liechtenstein	4.16	0	7.09
160	Bahamas	3.84	0	6.55
161	Portugal	3.84	0	6.55
162	Luxembourg	3.84	0	6.55
163	El Salvador	3.84	0	6.55
164	Tonga	3.83	3	3
165	Saint Vincent & Grenadines	3.29	4.31	0.55
166	Zambia	3.26	0	5.55
167	Namibia	3.14	2	3
168	China-Hong Kong	2.99	0	5.09
169	Uruguay	2.75	4	0
170	Thailand	2.50	1	3.09
171	Lesotho	2.45	1	3
172	Burundi	2.40	0	4.09
173	Guyana	2.38	3.46	0
174	Madagascar	2.22	2.38	1
175	Seychelles	1.76	0	3
176	Gambia	1.76	0	3
177	Sierra Leone	1.38	2	0
178	Estonia	1.28	1	1
179	China-Macau	0.64	0	1.09
180	China-Taiwan	0.59	0	1
181	Mozambique	0.59	0	1
182	Honduras	0.59	0	1
183	Dominica	0.32	0	0.55
184	Korea, South	0.00	0	0

185	Benin	0.00	0	0
186	Antigua & Barbuda	0.00	0	0
187	Belize	0.00	0	0
188	Grenada	0.00	0	0
189	Ireland	0.00	0	0
190	Kiribati	0.00	0	0
191	Marshall Islands	0.00	0	0
192	Sao Tome & Principe	0.00	0	0
193	Barbados	0.00	0	0
194	Micronesia Federated States of	0.00	0	0
195	Saint Kitts & Nevis	0.00	0	0
196	Guinea-Bissau	0.00	0	0

Appendix B: Description of the Observed (Coded) Measures used in Analysis

Data Source: Quantitative coding of the 2003 International Religious Freedom Reports

Transformations: Indicated below measure description where appropriate

Summary: Abuse Measure (Measure 1)
 Socio-Religious Hegemony Factor (Measures 2-4)
 Legal/Policy Regulation Factor (Measures 5-7)
 Description of Loop Scales (Measures 2 and 6) follows Measure 7

Measure 1: “Abuse Due to Low Religious Freedom”

<p><i>Considering the entire Report, estimate the number of people who were physically abused or displaced due to a lack of religious freedom in this country:</i></p>
--

<p>0 = none; 1 = > 0 < 10; 2 = 10 – 200; 3 = 201-1000; 4 = 1001 - 10,000; 5 = > 10,000</p>

Abuse due to Low Religious Freedom

Abuse due to Low Religious Freedom represents both the *extent* and *intensity* of religious freedom violations. This is a measure of the effects of low religious freedom primarily during the 12-month period of the Reports. It does not reveal the processes which lead to low religious freedom. Therefore, this measure is used as reliability check that allows a comparison of the RRF and Freedom House’s Religious Freedom Scale.

Note that the State Department Reports specifically enumerated the people abused and displaced due to violations of religious freedom, frequently citing names, places and specific situations. The Reports focused on violations that happened *during* the report period, but included violations considered recent enough to adversely impact the situation of religious freedom in the country. 58.2 percent of the countries had no physical abuses or displacements reported, but the remaining 41.8 percent of the countries had abuses with continuing effects reported, including 8.2 percent (16 countries) with more than 10,000 people abused or displaced due to a lack of religious freedom. This measure does include quantifiable abuses *mentioned in the Reports* that occurred *prior* to the report period. This was coded as such because someone who was abused or is still displaced, e.g., in Indonesia or East Timor, still bears the scars and effects of that experience. Even those who were displaced and have returned home may suffer the effects of that violation for many more years to come, if not for a lifetime. Extensive and severe violations such as rape, torture and/or the violent death of a relative continue effect the victim.

Socio-Religious Hegemony restriction of Religious Freedom

Measure 2: Anti-Brand Movements (Substantive Loop Scale)

* See 2 pages below for Loop Scale description

<i>What is the situation regarding social movements in relation to religious brands in the country?</i>		
6. Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand through nationally coordinated means. [national & organized activity]	hegemony	↑
4. Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand through unconnected, but regionally coordinated means. [regional & organized activity]		
2. Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand, but they are uncoordinated at either national or regional levels. [flashes of activity]	protectionism	↓
0. All social movement(s) that are reported either promote religious freedom or are amicable and do not intimidate people from (other) religious brands.		
1. Social movement(s) exist that campaign against certain religious brands, but they are uncoordinated at either national or regional levels. [flashes of activity]		
3. Social movement(s) exist that campaign against certain religious brands through unconnected, but regionally coordinated means. [regional & organized activity]		
5. Social movement(s) exist that campaign against certain religious brands through nationally coordinated means. [national & organized activity]		

Measure 3: Conflict with Other Brands (Substantive Scale)

<i>To what extent are societal attitudes open to all religious brands?</i>
0. Benign or equal to all
1. Inadvertent insensitivity to other religious brands (than the dominant religious brand).
2. Prejudices toward other religious brands that are real but hard to document.
3. Documented instances of discrimination towards other religious brands.
4. Documented instances of aggression towards other religious brands.
5. Documented instances of fatal aggression towards other religious brands.
6. Open warfare or ongoing violent conflict along religious lines or between religious brands.

Measure 4: Negativity to Other Brands (Additive Index)

<i>The following items are used to construct this index:</i>
A. Societal attitudes towards other or nontraditional religions are reported to be: 0=open and tolerant; 1=discriminatory; 2a=negative just in certain regions; 2b=negative just towards certain religious brands; 3=both 2a and 2b; 4=hostile
B. Relations between various religious communities are reported to be generally: 0=amicable; 1=sometimes strained; 2a=negative just in certain regions; 2b=negative just towards certain religious brands; 3=both 2a and 2b; 4=hostile
C. According to the Report, what are social attitudes to conversions to other religions? 0=no problems reported; 1=some tension; 2=negative; 3=physically hostile
D. Does the Report mention that traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing? 0=no; 1=yes
E. According to the Report, do established or existing religions try to shut out new religions in any way? 0=no; 1=yes

Original measures recoded to reflect that low values indicate lower constraints on religious freedom.

Legal/Policy Regulation of Religious Freedom

Measure 5: Restrictions on Brands (Substantive Scale)

<i>What is the highest level of restrictions (or incentives) reported?</i>	
6.	Prohibition of religious practice except for that which is approved by the Government.
5.	Government involvement in the internal and/or international affairs of religious brands.
4.	The Government targets certain religious brands to be controlled or proscribed.
3.	The Government denies (or provides) subsidies to some religious brands but not others for such things as religious education, salaries, etc. (including 'national patrimony').
2.	Restrictions on the use and/or ownership of property which are not equitable for all religious brands, e.g., 'national patrimony' care or Government ownership of religious buildings.
1.	Difficulties for certain religious brands registering or having a legally recognized status, but these difficulties do not proscribe those religious brands.
0.	None reported.

Measure 6: Legal/Policy Impetus (Substantive Loop Scale) * See next page on Loop Scales

<i>The religious legal/policy framework primarily responds to _____.</i>		
6.	immediate concerns that certain religious brands cause violence, instability or perceived threats to the <u>legitimacy</u> of the Government.	regulation
4.	immediate concerns that certain religious brands cause violence, instability or perceived threats to the <u>order</u> of society.	
2.	immediate concerns that certain religious brands cause violence, instability or perceived threats to the <u>minds</u> of some citizens.	subsidy/favoritism
0.	the ideal of assuring that no religion is established either by regulations or subsidies (favoritism), and that diversity in religious brands is a constructive social phenomenon.	
1.	the needs and aims of most religious brands.	
3.	the needs and aims of the historically established religious brand(s) of the country.	
5.	the needs and aims of one religious brand above all others.	

Measure 7: Macro Legal System (Additive Index)

<i>The following items are used to construct this index:</i>	
A.	Does this Section of the Report mention that there is a Constitution? 0=yes; 1=no Constitution, but law functions in its place; 2=no
B.	Does this Section of the Report mention that the Constitution provides for freedom of religion? 0=yes; 1=no Constitution, but law provides for freedom of religion; 2=no
C.	Does this Section of the Report mention that there is some sort of favored religion? 0=no; 1=historic religion or religious philosophy; 2=yes there is an official, established or state religion
D.	How is freedom of religion described in the Report? 0=law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government 'generally respects' this right in practice; 1= law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems exist, e.g., in certain localities; 2=limited and/or rights are not protected or are restricted; 3=does not exist
F.	Does the Report indicate that the Government <i>at all its levels</i> protects religious freedom? 0=yes or no was problem mentioned; 1= protects at most levels; 2= does not protect

Original measures recoded to reflect that low values indicate lower constraints on religious freedom.

Substantive Loop Scales

Two unique types of substantive scales were introduced during the Codebook development process: *straight substantive scales* and *substantive loop scales*. First, *straight substantive scales* focus on empirical observations of the qualitative data related to actions or patterns of behavior. Two such scales are used in this study: *Conflict with Other Brands* and *Restrictions on Brands* (Measures 3 and 5). Giving a country a single score on a substantive 7-point scale of increasing intensity can provide up to seven distinct pieces of information about a country. For example, on the *Conflict with Other Brands* scale (Measure 3), the intensity of the situation is represented by assigning a score of “5” for fatal aggression. This score indicates a more severe score than those below it on the scale but less severe than the item above it, open warfare. 7-point items (scaled 0-6) offer much more discrimination than dichotomous items (scored 0-1). The ability to discriminate between levels of intensity is critical to good measurement.

The second type of unique scale used is a *substantive loop scale*. Loop scales are also substantive scales with the unique feature that they can accommodate two different and seemingly paradoxical routes to the same outcome. Theoretically, loop scales presume that a common motivator underlies two different courses of action. Specifically, *a loop scale shows the progression to a common outcome that may play out differently depending on the context*. Other than that, a loop scale is like any other scale, i.e., a higher score represents a stronger degree of the measure.

While *loop scales* are my ‘invention,’ W. Cole Durham, Jr. (1996) credits George R. Ryskamp (1980) with identifying the loop-like relationship of different religious freedom variables. Ryskamp noticed that religious freedom paradoxically decreased with either persecution (regulation) or support (subsidy/ favoritism) of religion in Spain.¹⁷


The two loop scales used in this study are: *Anti-Brand Movements*, and *Legal/Policy Impetus* (Measures 2, and 6). Even though there is one numbering system on each loop scale, the numeric coding preserves which side of the loop the country tends toward (Figure 2 and Measure 6). It also gives stronger weight to one direction of the scale based on theoretical considerations.

¹⁷ Another example of a possible loop scale is Marital Breakdown, with ‘growing apart’ forming one side of the loop and ‘irreconcilable difference’ forming the other side.

The primary advantage of loop scales is that they make coding easier for diverse situations where the same underlying motivation is in operation, e.g., controlling instability caused by religious competition (through either favoritism or restriction). The loop scale in Figure 2 represents the impetus behind the laws a country makes regarding religious brands. The common outcome is regulated religious freedom.

Figure 2: Legal/Policy Impetus (Substantive Loop Scale)

The religious legal/policy framework primarily responds to concerns _____.

Regulation	Taiwan (0)	0 = ideal that no religion is established	South Korea (0)	Subsidy/Favoritism
2 = that religious brands threaten the <i>minds</i> of some citizens	Belgium (2)		Hong Kong (1)	1 = for the needs and aims of <i>most</i> religious brands
4 = that religious brands threaten the <i>order</i> of society	Singapore (4)		Chile (3)	3 = for the needs and aims of the <i>historically established</i> religious brands
6 = that religious brands threaten the <i>legitimacy</i> of the Government	Iraq (6)		Malaysia (5)	5 = for the needs and aims of <i>one</i> religious brand above all others

The impetus for the legal/policy framework in Taiwan and South Korea (both scoring 0) exemplifies the ideal that no religious brand is favored or singled out for regulation. On the favoritism side, Hong Kong (1) subsidizes schools run by various religious brands, while Chile's subsidy (3) of religious education goes primarily to Catholic instruction. Malaysia (5), on the other hand, provides government funds to directly support the Islamic religious establishment. Belgium subsidizes salaries of various religious teachers from most recognized religions, which would put it at 1 on the favoritism scale, but it also restricts minority religions it considers dangerous sects, which thus puts Belgium at 2. Singapore (4), being physically located at the tip of Malaysia, regulates all brands to assure order within the potentially volatile religious mix of their society. Of course, the situation in Iraq (6) is that religious brands threaten to lead the country into civil war, if they have not done so already.

The tandem powers of praise and punishment have long been recognized in many fields (e.g., Gallwey 1974). In fact, the above loop-approach to coding the impetus of laws restricting religious freedom is not new. An early study of the global restriction of religious liberty linked regulation and subsidy: "Freedom of religion limited, with state *controls* or state *effort on behalf* of religion or quasi-religion" ([italics mine] Bates 1945:547). Notice that Bates equates the two

to the same outcome. One of the few well-established principles of religious regulation is that the Countries of Earth use the alternating current of restriction and support to control the Cities of God (Bates 1945; Durham 1996; Finke and Stark 1992; Ryskamp 1980).

Please note that this is not an argument that regulation and favoritism are identical actions; rather, it is recognition of the common situation that, where there are laws restricting religion, there are also likely to be funds supporting (some) religion(s), and that these two actions have the same effect—the restriction of religious freedom. The main advantage of using such a loop scale is the ease of coding in the fairly common situation where the qualitative data only alludes to one side of the loop but focuses primarily on the other side. Other justifications for the use of loop scales include: economy of measures to make coding of subsequent years of the data more efficient; theoretical parsimony, i.e., religion is similarly regulated by praise and punishment;¹⁸ and they are empirically defensible.

Empirically, the measurements made with the loop scale above are consistent with other measures in the data set which measure each side of the loop independently. The loop score significantly correlates with a variable which measures whether the government funds religion in the country (pearson $r = .321$, $p < .001$, two-tailed), i.e., *favoritism*, as well as with a variable which measures the number of laws mentioned in the Reports that restrict religious freedom (pearson $r = .632$, $p < .001$, two-tailed), i.e., *regulation*.

¹⁸ the universal “yes-yes / no-no” way to communicate what can and can’t be done

APPENDIX C: Data Bias Test

An indirect test of the degree to which my methods overcame potential U.S. State Department biases is the strength of the correlation between the RFI and the State Department's list of 31 countries singled out for varying levels of concern in its general Introduction to the 2003 Report (indicated by *italics* in Appendix A). The concern list can be considered the conclusion the State Department draws from their overall Report. I coded those 31 countries according to the levels of concern indicated by the State Department's ordering and subjective categorization. The scale ranged between 5 = *Totalitarian or Authoritarian Attempts to Control Religious Beliefs or Practice*, and 1 = *Stigmatization of Certain Religions by Wrongfully Associating them with Dangerous Cults or Sects*. The 165 countries not on the concern list were coded as 0. The results are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Internal Bias Test

		State Department Countries of Concern Religious Freedom Reports 2003
Regulation of Religious Freedom Index (RRF)	Pearson r =	.439**
	N =	196
Religious Freedom Scale (Marshall 2000)	Pearson r =	.685**
	N =	74

*** p < .001 (2-tailed).

While the RRF significantly and positively correlates with the concern list (.410), it is not at a one-to-one level, which would indicate that the coding reflects the same biases of the State Department's conclusions from their data. Freedom House's Religious Freedom scale (Marshall 2000), however, correlates more strongly (.685), which reflects more of a shared bias.